Two Theories about Hatred

关于仇恨的两种理论

There are two theories perceiving hatred, one illustrates the condition of expressing objective hate to change others’ bad behaviors and another asserts that hatred has a subjective and unavoidable nature.

有两种关于仇恨的理论，一种阐述了表达客观仇恨以改变他人不良行为的状况，另一种则认为仇恨具有主观且不可避免的性质。

The first opinion is that humans possess some unlikeable characteristics which objectively incur hatred. Donald Winnicott, an influential pediatrician and psychoanalyst, terms “objective counter-transference” applying in psychological and psychotic therapy, which means analysts should express their natural feeling of love and hate to patients based on “objective observation” of the patient’s behaviors. In the preface of his article, this theory is said to be widely accepted now (Winnicott, 1994).

第一种观点是，人类具有一些不讨人喜欢的特征，这在客观上会引起仇恨。唐纳德·温尼科特是一位有影响力的儿科医生和精神分析学家，他在心理和精神病治疗中使用“客观反移情”，这意味着分析人员应该在对患者行为的“客观观察”的基础上，向患者表达他们对患者自然的爱恨。在他的文章的序言中，据说这个理论现在被广泛接受（温尼科特，1994）。

It can be inferred that hate can only be objective if it meets two criteria: First, a clinician does not hate a patient himself. If the clinician hates the patient, he would hate the things the patient does, which is not “objective observation”. In this case, his hatred is toward the person but not his behaviors. Second, every rational person deems that the patient’s deed is hateful. If one thinks it is hateful, but another does not, the hate is not objective. The first criterion is achievable, but, in reality, when a therapist seeing a mentally ill patient doing many abnormal things, it is hard to have no negative feeling towards the patient. The second criterion is also not always applicable. For example, if a patient shouts at the therapist, everyone would deem it hateful. But if a patient does not obey the therapist’s instructions, some would hate this, and some would not. Therefore, sometimes it is arbitrary to tell a patient that his behavior is hateful. In addition, the analyst may not observe throughout and be ignorant of factors contributing to the patient’s bad behaviors which could reduce his hatred. Due to these reasons, though Winnicott’s suggestion for analysts to genuinely convey their emotions to patients may lead to better communication and cooperation, it should be cautiously used to avoid bias, irrationality, and hurt.

可以推断，仇恨只有在满足两个标准的情况下才能是客观的：首先，临床医生自己并不恨病人。如果临床医生讨厌病人，他就会讨厌病人所做的事情，这不是“客观的观察”。在这种情况下，他憎恨的是那个人，而不是他的行为。第二，每一个理性的人都认为病人的行为是可恨的。如果一个人认为它是可仇恨的，而另一个人则不认为，那么仇恨就不是客观的。第一个标准是可以实现的，但在现实中，当一个医生看到一个精神病病人做许多不正常的事情时，很难对病人没有负面的感觉。第二个标准也并不总是适用的。例如，如果一个病人对着医生大喊大叫，每个人都会认为它可恨。但如果病人不服从医生的指示，有些人会讨厌这个，而有些人则不会。因此，有时告诉病人他的行为可恨是武断的。此外，医生可能不会全程观察，也不知道导致患者不良行为的因素，这可以减少他的仇恨。由于这些原因，尽管温尼科特建议医生真实地向患者传达他们的情绪可能会导致更好的沟通和合作，但它应该谨慎地使用，以避免偏见、非理性和伤害。

Winnicott’s theory renders patients accountable for analysts’ emotions, which may be problematic. Winnicott does not tell clinicians to adjust their attitudes but expects patients to change their behaviors to be lovable. For example, he had a patient who was disgusted for years but, due to therapy, became lovable one day. The patient’s disfavor was considered to be a “symptom” and his transformation to be lovable is “a tremendous advance in his adjustment to reality” (Winnicott, 1994). In this theory, a patient is judged by whether being liked by the analyst. Though others’ reactions are an important reference, but it is oversimplified that not being like means one does wrong. This may let patients care for physicians’ feelings too much and give physicians too much authority.

温尼科特的理论让病人对医生的情绪负责，这可能会有问题。温尼科特并没有告诉临床医生调整他们的态度，而是希望患者改变他们的行为变得可爱。例如，他对一个病人多年来一直感到厌恶，但由于治疗，有一天变得可爱起来。病人的不讨人喜欢被认为是一种“症状”，他变成可爱的人是“他适应现实的一个巨大进步”（温尼科特，1994）。在这个理论中，一个病人是由是否被医生喜欢来判断的。虽然其他人的反应是一个重要的参考，但它过于简化了，不被人喜欢意味着自己做错了。这可能会让病人过多地关心医生的感受，并给医生太多的权威。

Winnicott implies that it is not a duty to love someone, while it’s an individual’s responsibility to behave well in order to be lovable, and who is hated should be blamed for his bad behaviors. If a patient does not accept hate, it is because she cannot recognize that hate is generated by the very things she does (Winnicott, 1994). In this case, analysts do not initiatively love patients and patients need to seek for her love, which would make patients feel anxious and unsafe.

温尼科特暗示，爱某人不是责任，而表现良好而被喜爱是个人的责任，被憎恨的人应该因为他的不良行为而受到指责。如果一个病人不接受仇恨，那是因为她无法意识到仇恨是由她所做的事情所产生的（温尼科特，1994）。在这种情况下，医生并不一开始就爱病人，病人需要寻求她的爱，这会让病人感到焦虑和不安全。

Winnicott argues that if a clinician does not express her hate, a patient won’t trust her love to be authentic (Winnicott, 1994). However, we can evaluate the genuineness of an emotion by simply observing it. Study finds that when culturally diverse people were shown basic facial expressions, they did fairly well at recognizing them (Matsumoto & Ekman, 1989). Winnicott doesn’t believe that a clinician can only love a patient without hate, because the patient is mentally abnormal. However, another famous psychoanalyst, Melanie Klein, states that one is normally targeted for coexisting love and hate (Demir).

温尼科特认为，如果一个临床医生不表达她的仇恨，一个病人就不会相信她的爱是真实的（温尼科特，1994）。然而，我们可以通过仅仅观察一种情感来评估它的真实性。研究发现，当向文化背景多样的人展示基本的面部表情时，他们识别得相当好（松本和埃克曼，1989）。温尼科特不相信临床医生只爱不恨病人，因为病人精神不正常。然而，另一位著名的精神分析学家，梅勒妮·克莱因，说，一个人通常是爱与恨并存的目标（德米尔）。

Melanie Klein proposes a theory emphasizing the dualism and subjectivity of love and hate: humans naturally hold two types of conflicting instincts, which are named by Freud -- Eros, representing for life, love, harmony, pleasure and other positive pursuits, and Thanatos, representing for death, hate, destruction, anxiety, and other negative impulses. Hate is rooted in fear of death. Love and hate are innate subjective feelings (what “neonate brings into the world”). Love and hate perpetually interplay in people’s minds (Demir).

梅勒妮·克莱因提出了一种强调爱与恨的二元论和主观性的理论：人类自然拥有两种相互冲突的本能，被弗洛伊德命名——爱，代表生命、爱、和谐、快乐和其他积极的追求，以及死，代表死亡、仇恨、破坏、焦虑和其他负面冲动。仇恨根植于对死亡的恐惧。爱和恨是天生的主观感受（“新生儿来到这个世界带来了什么”）。爱与恨在人们的脑海中永远相互作用（德米尔）。

Love and hate are dual on an object which should be managed by the actor. When a mother satisfies her infant, she is loved by the infant. When she does not, she is hated. Unlike Winnicott, Klein doesn’t urge people who are targeted to seek to be loved and avoided being hated but requires people who incur the emotions to tolerate the coexistence of love and hate and contains hate, with love prevails (Demir). Winnicott notes that parents should not conceal their hatred in order to let their infant to learn how to deal with hate, which also works in clinician – patient relationship (Winnicott, 1994). While Klein doesn’t propose that one can learn to deal with hate by being hate. In the clinical setting, Klein focuses on the emotions generated by the patient (Berzoff, Flanagan, and Hertz, 2016) rather than let the patient receive the analyst’s emotions as a therapy method. I argue that Klein’s approach is better, because therapy method may influence a patient’s personality, since therapy is to rebuild a person’s spirit. Though expressing emotions to patient may help the therapy work better, use it as a therapy method may make the patient passive in relationships, while Klein’s way encourages patient to be responsible for his or her own emotions and to consider both sides when an emotion appear (not to take all of others’ reactions for own responsibility).

爱和恨在一个应该由主体管理的对象上是双重的。当一个母亲满足了她的婴儿时，她就会被这个婴儿所爱。当她不这样做时，她就会被憎恨。与温尼科特不同的是，克莱因并不敦促那些成为目标的人寻求被爱，避免被仇恨，而是要求那些产生情感的人容忍爱与恨的共存，并包容仇恨，爱则占优（德米尔）。温尼科特指出，父母不应该为了让他们的婴儿学习如何处理仇恨而隐藏他们的仇恨，这在临床医患关系中也起作用（温尼科特，1994）。而克莱恩并没有建议人们可以通过仇恨来对付仇恨。在临床环境中，克莱因关注的是患者产生的情绪（伯佐夫、弗拉纳根和赫兹，2016），而不是让患者接受医生的情绪作为一种治疗方法。我认为克莱因的方法更好，因为治疗方法可能会影响病人的人格，因为治疗是为了重建一个人的精神。虽然对病人表达情绪可能帮助治疗工作，使用它作为治疗方法可能使病人陷入被动的关系，而克莱因的方式鼓励病人负责他或她自己的情绪并在情绪出现时考虑双方（不是所有别人的反应都为自己的责任）。

Klein would disagree of using “objective hate” as an evaluation standard, since she states that hate is subjective feeling which may be projected into external objects. Anxiety arises from the death instinct which is an unconscious fear of annihilation, and in order to release the anxiety, ego expels painful and dangerous feelings which are targeted to the environment. Projection, a defend mechanism, is the deflection of the death instinct (Demir). It distorts how an individual perceive others. It is common sense that our hate towards others may not be reasonable, which could warn Winnicott and who accept his theory of being cautious when taking the position as a judger regarding their emotions.

克莱因不会同意使用“客观的仇恨”作为评价标准，因为她说，仇恨是一种主观的感觉，可以投射到外部物体中。焦虑产生于死亡本能，这是一种对毁灭的无意识的恐惧，为了释放焦虑，自我排出了针对环境的痛苦和危险的感觉。投射是一种防御机制，是死亡本能的偏转（德米尔）。它扭曲了个人对他人的看法。常识是，我们对他人的仇恨可能是不合理的，这可以警告温尼科特和接受他的理论的人，即在判断他们的情绪时要谨慎。

Winnicott would agree with Klein that hate is very natural and should be normalized. He lists 18 ways (which may not be very applicable) why a mother can naturally hate her baby (Winnicott, 1994). But Winnicott doesn’t go further to illustrate that since a baby can be hated for so many reasons, being hated should also be nominalized and not be treated as a “symptom”.

温尼科特会同意克莱因的观点，即仇恨是很自然的，应该被正常化。他列出了18种方式（这可能不是很适用），为什么一个母亲会自然地讨厌她的孩子（温尼科特，1994）。但温尼科特并没有进一步说明，既然一个婴儿可以因为很多原因而被恨，被恨也应该被正常化，而不是被视为一种“症状”。

Winnicott and Klein both recognize hatred and other negative emotions to have benefits. Winnicott writes, if a patient is incapable of feeling depression, he cannot deeply experience guilt (Winnicott, 1994), which means that he does not feel very bad of his wrongdoing and thus may not have a strong sense of morality. Klein states that hate is arouse by unpleasant events and would impel people to attack and destroy the cause of frustration (Demir), so I infer that people protect themselves from threat due to hatred.

温尼科特和克莱因都认识到仇恨和其他负面情绪有好处。温尼科特写道，如果一个病人不能感到抑郁，他就无法深深感受到罪恶感（温尼科特，1994），这意味着他对自己的错误行为不会感到很糟糕，因此可能没有强烈的道德感。克莱因说，仇恨是由不愉快的事件引起的，并会促使人们攻击和摧毁导致沮丧的原因（德米尔），所以我推断，人们出于仇恨保护自己免受威胁。

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